

True Democracy and Complacency: Linking Voting Outcome Expectations to Complacency Variability Using Qualitative Comparative Means.

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Abstract

The coming of extreme democratic outcomes in 2016 like BREXIT and USEXIT has increased interest recently in understanding: a) how they come to be as they are usually the unexpected democratic outcomes of the moment, which explains the after the fact widespread discontent and surprise when people realize that the unexpected has actually happened; and b) why they do not fall under normal polling predictions or analysis.

At the heart of specific democratic outcomes is complacency, the protest behavior that has the power to determine if there will be a normal democratic outcome or an extreme democratic outcome at the end of a democratic process. Yet not much is known or written to my knowledge about the role of complacency in determining democratic outcomes in a true democracy or about democratic outcome expectations. Among the goals of this paper is to link voting outcome expectations to a complacency variability model using qualitative comparative means.

Key concepts

Majority rule, complacency, partial complacency, full complacency, democratic outcomes, normal democratic outcomes, extreme democratic outcomes, true majority complacency, true minority complacency, full participation assumption, full voting assumption, complacency assumption, BREXIT, USEXIT.

Introduction

a) True democracy and democratic outcomes

It can be said that democratic outcomes(DO) in a true democracy(TD), one person, one vote, it is determined through a voting system(V) that brings together the views of the true majority(T) and the views of the true minority(M), a situation that can be represented graphically as follows:




Figure 1 Linking true democracy(TD) and democratic outcomes
True democracy(TD) is supported by an inclusive true
majority based voting system(V) to reach democratic
outcomes(DO).

We can see in Figure 1 above the following things: i) The democratic outcome(DO) could reflect the will of the true majority T or the will of the true minority M depends on who wins the democratic contest V as indicated by the continuous arrows from T and M to DO. In other words, the democratic outcome(DO) could be a normal democratic outcome(NDO) if the will of the true majority T wins or it could be an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) if the will of the true minority M wins; and ii) Not knowing what type of complacency behavior($C^* = ?$) is affecting the democratic contest V affects our ability to predict or foresee the type of democratic outcome(DO) that should be expected.

It has been pointed out recently that under unclear voting rules any democratic outcome(DO) is possible, even extreme democratic outcomes(EDO)(Muñoz 2017a).

b) Normal democratic outcomes and complacency

If we assume that the true democracy model(TD) and voting system V is operating under true majority friendly complacency($C^* = C_1$), then the will of the true majority T wins the democratic contest, the scenario reflected in Figure 2 below:





Figure 2 Linking true democracy(TD) and normal democratic outcomes(NDO). True democracy(TD) under normal democratic outcome friendly complacency $C^* = C_1$ leads to normal democratic outcomes(NDO) as the view of the majority T wins the contest.

We can appreciate in Figure 2 above the following things: i) The democratic outcome(DO) is a normal democratic outcome(NDO) as it reflects the will of the true majority T. In other words the true majority T wins the democratic contest V as indicated by the continuous arrows from T to NDO; and the true minority M loses as indicated by the broken arrow from M to NDO; and ii) Knowing that true majority friendly complacency behavior($C^* = C_1$) is affecting the democratic contest V help us in our ability to predict or foresee that the type of democratic outcome(DO) that should be expected is a normal democratic outcome(NDO). Muñoz(2017b) has highlighted that majority rule based democratic system are expected to produce always normal democratic outcomes(NDO) because there is an assumption of no complacency(NC) or assumption of no protest behavior as every voter is expected to participate and vote for the candidate or option of their choice so that the number of voters equal the number of votes. In other words, when there is no complacency(NC) the true majority T wins.

So if we make true majority friendly complacency($C^* = C_1$) equal to no complacency(NC) so that $C^* = C_1 = NC$, then Figure 2 above reflects also the structure of majority rule based democratic systems.

c) Extreme democratic outcomes and complacency

If we look at extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) as the extreme opposite of normal democratic outcomes(NDO) where the will of the will of the true minority M wins the democratic contest V, then we can represent the situation as shown in Figure 3 below:



**Figure 3 Linking true democracy(TD) and extreme democratic outcomes(EDO)
True democracy(TD) under extreme democratic outcome friendly complacency $C^* = C_2$ leads to extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) as the view of the true minority M wins the contest.**

We can observe in Figure 3 above the following aspects: i) The democratic outcome(DO) is an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) as it reflects the will of the true minority M. In other words the true minority M wins the democratic contest V as indicated by the continuous arrows from M to EDO; and the true majority T loses as indicated by the broken arrow from T to EDO; and ii) Knowing that true minority friendly complacency behavior($C^* = C_2$) is affecting the democratic contest V help us in our ability to predict or foresee that the type of democratic outcome(DO) that should be expected is an extreme democratic outcome(EDO). Muñoz(2017a; 2017b) has stressed that majority rule based democratic system are expected to produce always extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) when there is full true majority complacency or protest behavior(FTC) affecting the voting system(V).

So if we make true minority friendly complacency($C^* = C_2$) equal to full true majority complacency(FTC) so that $C^* = C_2 = \text{FTC}$, then Figure 3 above reflects also the structure of minority rule based democratic systems.

d) The need to understand the link between complacency and democratic outcomes

The coming of extreme democratic outcomes in 2016 like BREXIT and USEXIT has increased interest recently in understanding a) how they come to be as they are usually the unexpected democratic outcomes of the moment, which explains the after the fact widespread discontent and surprise when people realize that the unexpected has actually happened such as in the UK(BBC 2016) and in the USA(Rawlinson 2016); and b) why they do not fall under normal polling predictions or analysis as the case of BREXIT (Jackson 2016) and the case of USEXIT(Byers 2016) showed. In the case of the USA since chaos was at the heart of extreme democratic outcome Trump's camp continue to create chaos(Barron 2018); and since the loss of power is associated with people not showing up for votes to regain power the democratic party's camp is investing in programs

aimed at increasing voter turnout (Pramuk 2018), in both cases actions are not directly linked to what really happened in 2016 in terms of true majority complacency, either to maintain power or to regain power. This may be explained by the knowledge gap created when there is a paradigm shift in this 2016 USA case a shift from a normal to an extreme democratic outcome as both the winner and the loser are surprised at the same time with no clear why about what had happened as the one not expected to win wins; and the one not expected to lose loses. Since the goal of extreme democratic outcomes is to follow the best interest of the true minority it should be expected that once they are in power they will move quickly to affect majority rule based values and institutions, which is the observation that may be behind President Obama's 2017 deeply felt remark to voters that democracy needs tending to work well so they need to turn out to vote and avoid complacency to ensure democracy does not go backwards (Green 2017).

Hence, at the heart of specific democratic outcomes is complacency, the protest behavior that has the power to determine if there will be a normal democratic outcome or an extreme democratic outcome at the end of a democratic process. Yet not much is known or written to my knowledge about the role of complacency in determining democratic outcomes in a true democracy or about democratic outcome expectations. Among the goals of this paper is to link voting outcome expectations to a complacency variability model using qualitative comparative means.

Objectives

The paper has four main objectives: a) To introduce the structure of true democracy at the heart of majority rule based systems using qualitative comparative means; b) To show how this model is affected by complacency behavior; c) To indicate how the model above can be transformed into a voting outcome expectation model; and b) To link this model to complacency variability by indicating the expected democratic outcome per specific type of complacency behavior.

Methodology

First, the terminology used in this paper is introduced. Second, some operational concepts and models are shared. Third, the structure of the true democracy model is highlighted. Fourth, the structure of true democracy is lined to complacency behavior. Fifth, the democratic outcome voting expectation model is stated. Sixth, given specific complacency types specific expectations are indicated. Seventh, a summary and implications are stressed. And finally, some food for thoughts and relevant conclusions are provided.

Terminology

V = Voting model

V_i = Voter "i"

G_1 = Group of voters 1

G_2 = Group of voters 2

T = True majority	M = true minority
D = Democracy	TD = True democracy
T = Dominant/active component	t = Dominated/passive component
M = Dominant/active component	m = Dominated/passive component
C = Complacency	NC = No complacency
TC = True majority complacency	TNC = True majority no complacency
MC = True minority complacency	MNC = True minority no complacency
FTC = Full true majority complacency	PTC = Partial true majority complacency
FMC = Full true minority complacency	PMC = Partial true minority complacency
NDO = Normal democratic outcome	EDO = Extreme democratic outcome
BREXIT = UK June 2016 outcome	USEXIT = USA November 2016 outcome
ND = No democracy exists	CRE = Complacency rule expectations

Operational concepts and operational models

A) *Operational concepts*

- 1) **Democracy**, *system that aims at providing equal opportunity to elect, to be represented, and to share in the benefits to all its members;*
- 2) **True democracy**, *there is equal opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;*
- 3) **Partially distorted democracy**, *there is not equal opportunity in at least one democratic aspect;*
- 4) **Fully distorted democracy**, *there is inequality of opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;*
- 5) **Majority rule system**, *the electoral system where the majority rules decides the winner of democratic contexts;*

6) Voters, each individual in the electoral system acting without complacency and who is committed to make sure his vote or her vote is counted in the determination of the democratic outcome with the goal to maintain or improve his current or future benefits and rights;

7) True majority, the actual number of voters who win the democratic context;

8) True minority, the actual number of voters who lose the democratic context;

9) Complacency, the social discontent or protest or frustration affecting opposing groups with the given democratic or electoral system choices that may lead voters from the true majority and/or the true minority to not vote at all or if they vote they go for a protest vote by either voiding their vote or shifting their vote to other choices in the belief that their party will still win or will still lose anyway without their vote or in the belief that their vote is just one vote anyway and it will not matter in the end result; Hence, complacency based voting is linked to pure dissatisfaction as voting behavior takes place without thinking much about the impact that this action may have in the end on the balance of current and future majority and minority democratic rights;

10) No complacency, the absence of social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral system that leads each voter from each group to vote for their preferred democratic choice to ensure his or her vote is counted, therefore no complacency based voting is linked either to ensuring the preservation and enhancing of current democratic rights in one group or linked to seeking the erosion or change of those rights or to slowing the pace of democratic change in the other group;

11) Partial complacency, the partial social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is not widespread; some voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;

12) Full complacency, the general social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is widespread; many voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;

13) True majority complacency, it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;

14) True minority complacency, it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;

15) True majority no complacency, everybody in the true majority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;

16) True minority no complacency, everybody in the true minority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;

17) Normal democratic outcome, *under no complacency or not protest behavior everybody votes and the true majority wins the democratic contest; governments retain or lose power without big surprises. Inclusion, equality, stability, harmony, the truth, trust, clarity, scientific facts, and the will of the majority for the common good are the heart of normal democratic outcomes.*

18) Extreme democratic outcome, *under full true majority complacency or full true majority protest behavior the true minority wins the democratic context, governments lose or win power under a big surprise as the democratic option that seems impossible to happen wins the day. Exclusion, inequality, instability, chaos, fake truth, fake trust, confusion, fake facts, and the will of the minority for the good of the minority are the heart of extreme democratic outcomes.*

19) Internal complacency, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by internal group divisions(e.g. divisive choice/leader selection);*

20) External complacency, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by external group divisions(e.g. equally disliked competing choices/leaders);*

21) Full democracy, *a full inclusion model, a true democracy;*

22) Partial democracy, *a partial inclusion model, a distorted democracy;*

23) Democratic stability, *the tendency towards harmony associated with specific democratic outcomes;*

24) Full democratic stability, *the tendency towards full harmony associated with normal democratic outcomes;*

25) Full democratic instability, *the tendency towards zero harmony associated with extreme democratic outcomes.*

26) BREXIT, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the UK withdrawing from the European Union.*

27) BREXISM, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of economic or territorial or state based unions.*

28) USEXIT, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the USA withdrawing from the international and local order.*

29) USEXISM, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of the international and local order.*

30) EXISM, *the extreme democratic movements aiming at destroying majority rule based institutions, locally and globally.*

31) Democratic normalism, the tendency of normal democratic outcomes to move towards more stable or balance democratic conditions through time as they seek responsible majority rule.

32) Democratic extremism, the tendency of extreme democratic outcomes to move towards the more unstable or unequal democratic conditions as they flourish under irresponsible minority rule.

B) Operational models

a) The democratic outcome line(L)

The democratic outcome resulting from following the majority rule based system can be represented in Figure 4 below assuming a) there are two groups of voters, G_1 and G_2 where group $G_2 > G_1$ and therefore $G_2 = T > G_1 = M$; and b) that G_1 got X number of votes and G_2 obtained Y number of votes; and hence, $Y > X$:




Figure 4 The democratic outcome line: it matches the number of votes received by each group one vote per person under no complacency(NC) so that the true majority $T = G_2$ got Y votes; and the true minority $M = G_1$ received X votes.

Notice that Figure 4 above summarizes the structure of a normal democratic outcome(NDO) resulting from a majority based voting system(V) working under no complacency(NC), where everybody participates and everybody votes, matching that way the number of individuals in each group with the number of votes received by each group($G_1 = X$ and $G_2 = Y$). In others world, the democratic outcome line(L) showed in Figure 6 above matches the votes received by each group, where the true minority M gets X votes and the true majority T gets Y votes.

b) The complacency range line(CRL)

Complacency(C) or protest behavior may lead to a total or partial collapse of votes of the true majority(T) or the true minority(M); and this complacency behavior(C)

determines the resulting democratic outcome. And since complacency(C) is negatively associated with harmony or stability, the more complacency or protest behavior in the democratic process the less harmony or stability in the determination of the democratic outcome is to be expected.

In other words, the wider the complacency range(CR), the wider the possible vote collapse due to protest behavior, and therefore the less harmony or stability in the determination of the democratic outcome(DO). Hence, the wider the complacency range(CR) or the larger the size of protest behavior the more unpredictability with respect to the resulting democratic outcome(DO). This situation can be appreciated by looking at the direction of the arrow representing the complacency range line(CRL) in Figure 5 below:




Figure 5 The complacency range line: The true majority(T) complacency range goes from point (ii) to zero; and the true minority(M) complacency range goes from point (i) to zero.

The arrow moving towards zero in Figure 5 above indicates the direction in which complacency(C) or protest behavior can make the true majority(T) and the true minority(M) vote collapse. Therefore, the complacency range(CR) for the true majority(T) in Figure 7 above goes from point (ii) to zero if the true majority vote collapses completely; and the complacency range(CR) for the true minority(M) goes from point (i) to zero if the minority vote collapses completely. We can see in Figure 5 above that when there is complacency(C) or protest behavior, there is vote collapse, and under those conditions a normal democratic outcome(NDO) is no longer guaranteed all the time as now the possibility of having an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) exists.

c) The no complacency points line(NCPL)

When there is no complacency(NC) or no protest behavior we have a normal democratic outcome(NDO) as indicated in the introduction. In other words, when there is true majority no complacency(TNC) and true minority no complacency(MNC) at the same time, we have a normal democratic outcome(NDO) under majority rule. The points of true

majority no complacency(TNC) and of true minority no complacency(MNC) are shown in Figure 6 below:




Figure 6 The no complacency points line: There is true majority no complacency(TNC) at point (ii); and there is true minority no complacency(MNC) at point (i); and therefore, $T = G2 > M = G1$.

We can see in Figure 6 above that under no complacency(NC) or no protest behavior everybody participates and everybody votes in the true majority(T) and in the true minority(M); and therefore, there are two normal democratic outcome(NDO) no complacency(NC) points: 1) the true majority no complacency point(TNC) at point (ii)-the true majority(T) votes at point (ii) so $T = Y$ votes; and 2) the true minority no complacency point(MNC) at point (i)-the true minority(M) votes at point (i) so $M = X$ votes; and under those conditions the true majority T wins. The situation in Figure 6 above is one of harmony or stability as it is normal democratic outcomes(NDO), the result of full no complacency(FNC) as there is true majority no complacency(TNC) and true minority no complacency(MNC) at the same time. In other words, under no complacency(NC) or no protest behavior we always have a normal democratic outcome(NDO).

d) The complacency points line(CPL)

When there is complacency(C) or protest behavior, then we can think about complacency points associated with the true majority(T) and with the true minority(M) and about vote collapses; and therefore, we can think about the instability in the determination of the democratic outcome that they bring, which are indicated in Figure 7 below:




Figure 7 Complacency points line: There is partial true majority complacency(PTC) at point 'c'; and there is full true majority complacency(FTC) at point 'a'. There is partial true minority complacency(PMC) at point 'b'; and there is full true minority complacency(FMC) at point 'a'.

We can see in Figure 7 above the following complacency points: 1) a point of partial true majority complacency(PTC) at point “c”; 2) a point of full true majority complacency(FTC) at point “a”; 3) a point of partial true minority complacency(PMC) at point “b”; and 4) a point of full true minority complacency(FMC) at point “a”.

With respect to the true majority(T), vote collapse, and the resulting democratic outcome, other things being equal, we can use Figure 7 above to highlight the following: 1) Point “c” is a point of partial true majority complacency(PTC) or partial protest behavior, it collapses a little from point (ii) to point “c”, but still the true majority wins as $Y - c > X + c$ and “c” is the size of the true majority(T) vote collapse under partial complacency(PC); and 2) point “a” is a point of general true majority complacency(FTC) or full protest voting or behavior, it collapses so much from point (ii) to point “a” that the true minority(M) wins as $Y - a < X + a$, where “a” is the size of the true majority(T) collapse under full complacency(FC). Therefore, under partial true majority complacency(PTC) the true majority T wins, but with a smaller true majority; and under full true majority complacency(FTC) the true minority M wins and therefore we have an extreme democratic outcome(EDO). Hence, the unexpected outcome happens, the extreme democratic outcome(EDO), only when there is full true majority complacency(FTC) or widespread true majority protest behavior.

With respect to the true minority(M), vote collapse and the resulting democratic outcome, other things being equal, we can say from Figure 7 above that: 1) point “a” is a point of general true minority complacency(FMC) or protest behavior, it collapses a lot from point (i) to point “a”, where “a” is the size of the true minority(M) collapse under general complacency(FC); and it loses the election to the largest true majority(T) since Y

+ a > X - a ; and 2) point “b” is a point of partial true minority complacency(PTM) or protest voting or behavior as it collapses a little from point (i) to point “b”, where “b” is the size of the true minority(M) collapse under partial complacency(PC) losing the election to a bigger true majority(T) as Y + b > X - b. Therefore, under full true minority complacency(FMC) the true minority M loses to the largest true majority; and under partial true minority complacency(PMC) the true minority M loses too to a larger true majority;

C) Operational voting model

a) The general voting model

If we have a one person one vote system, then we can express the population of voters(V_p) as follows:

$$1) V_p = V_1 + V_2 + V_3 + \dots + V_{100} + V_{101} + \dots + V_n$$

Model V_p in expression 1) above gathers all voters from voter V₁ to voter V_n, which can also be stated as indicated below:

$$2) V_p = \sum_{i=1}^n V_i$$

Therefore, formula 2) above indicates the summation of all voters.

b) The general voting model by groupings

We can also expressed the population of voters in formula 1) and 2) in two main groups or views, group G₁ and group G₂ as shown below:

$$3) G_1 = V_1 + V_2 + \dots + V_{100} = \sum_{j=1}^r V_j \text{ and } G_2 = V_{101} + \dots + V_n = \sum_{k=1}^s V_k, \text{ where } r + s = n$$

Therefore, the voting model by groups can now be indicated as follows:

$$4) V_p = G_1 + G_2$$

In the model V_p in expression 4) above we can see that the views of both groups G₁ and G₂ matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

c) The general voting model in terms of true minority and true majority

If we assume that group G₂ > G₁, then G₂ is the true majority (T) and G₁ is the true minority (M) so that G₁ = M and G₂ = T; and therefore, the following is true:

$$5) V_p = M + T$$

In the model V_p in expression 5) above we can see that the views of both groups M and T matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

d) The fully inclusive general voting model

The voting model(V) that brings together the competing views of groups of participants is the ideal voting model as it is fully inclusive as indicated below:

6) $V = G_2.G_1 = T.M$

Model V in expression 6) above tells us that the views of G_2 and G_1 and the views of the true majority T and the true minority M are present in the model at the same time; and therefore it is fully inclusive.

The structure of true democracy

As indicated in the introduction true democracy(TD) is the democratic system that is supported by a fully inclusive voting process(V), and therefore, the following holds true if we make $TD = V$ in expression 6) above:

7) $TD = V = G_2.G_1 = T.M$

Expression 7) above simply says that true democracy(TD) is a system based on a fully inclusive voting system(V) that brings together the views of competing groups or views in order to determine the ruler of that democracy.

The structure of true democracy under complacency

Different types of complacency(C) lead true democratic processes(TD) to produce different democratic outcomes(DO) as highlighted below:

8) $C[TD] = C[V] = C[G_2.G_1] = C[T.M]-----\rightarrow DO = ?$

Expression 8) above let us see that complacency(C) systematically affect the true democracy system(TD) determining the democratic outcome(DO), but we do not yet know the type of democratic outcome($DO = ?$) as we do not know the type of complacency($C = ?$) or protest behavior affecting it. Notice that if there is no protest behavior $C = NC$, then we have democratic outcome(DO) that is a normal democratic outcome(NDO) as under majority rule based democratic systems the true majority T wins. Notice too that complacency(C) can be seen as a point through which the nature of a democratic outcome can be affected or changed like for example targeted manufactured chaos and/or natural chaos.

Linking true democracy voting outcome expectations to complacency variability

To link complacency variability(C^*) to true democratic outcome expectations(DOE) we make $C = C^*$ in formula 8 above, and we get the following model structure;

$$9) C^*[TD] = C^*[V] = C^*[G_2.G_1] = C^*[T.M]-----\rightarrow DOE = ?$$

The voting outcome expectations model in expression 9) above help us to predict the type of democratic outcome(DOE) that can be expected per each type of complacency behavior(C^*) that is affecting the true democracy mode(TD). Again, you can see that if chaos is targeted to create specific type of complacency or protest behavior it can change the expected democratic outcome, and even lead to extreme democratic outcomes as the nature of C^* would be affected. There are five specific cases of complacency variability(C^*): the case of partial true minority complacency(PMC), the case of full true minority complacency(TMC), the case of partial true majority complacency(PTC), the case of full true majority complacency(FTC), and the case of no complacency(NC).

Deriving true democracy voting outcome expectations associate with specific types of complacency

Below the five complacency cases(C^*) mentioned above are described in detail to link each of those cases to specific democratic outcomes expectations:

a) Voting outcome expectations under partial true minority complacency ($C^* = PMC$)

If $T > M$ and M goes down by some votes due to partial true minority complacency(PMC), then still $T > M$; and under majority rule based true democracy in this case T wins. According to the operational complacency models when the type of complacency affecting the system is $C = C^* = PMC$, then the following holds true when substituting this in expression 9) above,

$$10) PMC[TD] = PMC[V] = PMC[G_2.G_1] = PMC[TM]-----\rightarrow T \text{ wins} = NDO$$

DOE₁ = Expectation 1: When the true democracy(TD) is under partial true minority complacency(PMC), the true majority T wins, a normal democratic outcome(NDO).

b) Voting outcome expectations under full true minority complacency ($C^* = FMC$)

If $T > M$ and M goes down by many votes due to full true minority complacency(FMC), then still $T > M$; and under majority rule based true democracy in this case T wins too. According to the operational complacency models above when the type of complacency affecting the system is $C = C^* = FMC$, then the following holds true when substituting this in expression 9) above,

$$11) FMC[TD] = FMC[V] = FMC[G_2.G_1] = FMC[TM]-----\rightarrow T \text{ wins} = NDO$$

DOE₂ = Expectation 2: When the true democracy(TD) is under full true minority complacency(FMC), the true majority T wins, a normal democratic outcome(NDO).

c) Voting outcome expectations under partial true majority complacency (C* = PTC)

If $T > M$ and T goes down by some votes due to partial true majority complacency(PTC), but still $T > M$, then under majority rule based true democracy the true majority T still wins. According to the operational complacency models above when the type of complacency affecting the system is $C = C^* = PTC$, then the following holds true when substituting this in expression 9) above,

12) $PTC[TD] = PTC[V] = PTC[G_2.G_1] = PTC[TM] \text{-----} \rightarrow T \text{ wins} = NDO$

DOE₃ = Expectation 3: When the true democracy(TD) is under partial true majority complacency(PTC), the true majority T wins, a normal democratic outcome(NDO).

d) Voting outcome expectations under full true majority complacency (C* = FTC)

If $T > M$ and T goes down by so many votes such that now $T < M$ due to full true majority complacency(FTC), then under majority rule based true democracy the true minority M wins. According to the operational complacency models above when the type of complacency affecting the system is $C = C^* = FTC$, then the following holds true when substituting this in expression 9) above,

13) $FTC[TD] = FTC[V] = FTC[G_2.G_1] = FTC[TM] \text{-----} \rightarrow M \text{ wins} = EDO$

DOE₄ = Expectation 4: When a true democracy(TD) is under full true majority complacency(FTC), the true minority M wins, an extreme democratic outcome(EDO).

Notice that expression 13) above reflects the structure of extreme democratic outcomes like BREXIT and USEXIT, where the true majority vote collapses.

e) Voting outcome expectations under no complacency (NC)

If everybody participates and votes for their preferred true majority and true minority candidates because there is no complacency(NC), then $T > M$; and under majority rule based true democracy the true majority T wins. According to the operational complacency models above when the type of complacency affecting the system is $C = C^* = NC$, then the following holds true when substituting this in expression 9) above,

14) $NC[TD] = NC[V] = NC[G_2.G_1] = NC[TM] \text{-----} \rightarrow T \text{ wins} = NDO$

DOE₅ = Expectation 5: When a true democracy(TD) is under no complacency(NC), the true majority T wins, a normal democratic outcome(NDO).

Notice that this is the democratic outcome(DO) usually expected under majority rule democracies like western democracies because there is an assumption of full

participation and full voting or an assumption of no complacency(NC) or an assumption of no protest behavior; and therefore, expression 14) above highlights the structure of expected normal democratic outcomes(NDO) under no complacency or no protest behavior.

Summary:

i) When there is no complacency(NC) and when there is no full true majority complacency(FTC) we should expect to see a normal democratic outcome(NDO); and ii) Only when there is full true majority complacency(FTC) we should expect to see an extreme democratic outcome(EDO).

Implications

a) The complacency point C^* in formula 9) can be seen as a point of entry that can be used to influence the democratic process; b) Natural chaos from internal and external complacency and manufactured chaos, internal and external from fake news or bold statements or conspiracy theories all can affect complacency; and if chaos is aimed at maximizing true majority complacency it can lead to extreme democratic outcomes; and c) A democratic program, regulations and incentives, aimed at eliminating or minimizing true majority complacency would ensure the persistence of normal democratic outcomes and maintain democratic stability.

Food for thoughts

i) Should voters have the right to factual and truthful political information on which to base their election choices?, I think yes, what do you think?; ii) Should rules be in place indicating what type of conduct would disqualify candidates upon they coming into light before or during or after an election?, I think yes, what do you think?; iii) Should rules be in place that allow voters to remove a representative or candidate that refuses to resign in the face of disqualifying conditions?, I think yes, what do you think?; and iv) Should the democratic process be protected against manufactured chaos, both internally and/or externally driven?, I think yes, what do you think?

Specific conclusions

First, it was shown that under complacency behavior the voting outcome in a true democracy under majority rule can be normal, reflecting the will of the majority or it can be extreme, reflecting the will of the minority, and this situation can be capture in a simple framework. Second, it was pointed out that we can derive voting outcome expectations given the existence of specific types of complacency or protest behavior affecting the democratic process. For example, under full true majority complacency we expect to have an extreme democratic outcome; and under no complacency at all, we expect to have a normal democratic outcome. And finally, it was stressed that natural and manufactured

chaos are linked to complacency behavior; and therefore they affect complacency behavior and actually they can be used to favor the occurrence of specific democratic outcomes.

General conclusions

First, complacency theory can be link to the structure of true majority based democratic systems. Second, depending on the type of complacency at play, we can have different types of democratic outcomes. Third, this observation can be used to state a voting outcome expectation model, which given specific types of complacency at plan can help us to state voting outcome expectations such as those associated with normal democratic outcomes and with extreme democratic outcomes. And finally, it was stressed that the democratic outcome expectation model is sensitive to chaos as affects complacency behavior, which in turn affect expected democratic outcomes.

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