

# Upside Down Democratic Outcomes: Stating the Complacency Conditions Under Which Extreme Democratic Outcomes Such as BREXIT and USEXIT Should Be Expected to Take Place Using Qualitative Comparative Means

By

Lucio Muñoz\*

\* Independent Qualitative Comparative Researcher / Consultant, Vancouver, BC, Canada Email: [munoz@interchange.ubc.ca](mailto:munoz@interchange.ubc.ca)

## Abstract

It can be said a) that the world of democratic outcomes(DO) is the world where the democratic process(V1) bring together competing group of individuals in order to determine who rules in that democracy; and b) that without clear participation and voting rules, the resulting democratic outcome(DO) can be a normal democratic outcome(NDO) where the majority view rules or an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) where the minority view rules depending on whether the will of the majority(T) or the will of the minority(M) is reflected by the group who wins the democratic process(V1). In other words, if there are no clear rules governing participation and winners and losers in a democracy anything can happen.

It can be said that the world of normal democratic outcomes(NDO) is the world where the majority view(T) wins the majority rule based voting contest( $V = TM$ ) one person one vote as everybody is expected to participate and vote. In other words, this world operates under no complacency(NC) or no protest behavior. Here, there are clear rules governing winners and losers as well as there are clear participation expectations: the true majority(T) wins under no complacency(NC) and the true minority(M) loses as all members vote for the candidate of their preferred choice. And therefore, in true democracies under majority rule the following holds true:  $V1 = V = TM$ , where T wins.

If we look at extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) as the total opposite of normal democratic outcomes(NDO), then it can be said that the world of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) is the world where the true minority view(M) wins the majority rule based voting contest(V) one person one vote in a true democracy and where the view of the true majority(T) loses as the democratic process in this case is operating under some kind of minority rule friendly complacency behavior( $C = ?$ ). In other words, extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) take place when democratic systems are under some time of extreme democratic outcome friendly complacency( $C = ?$ ) or protest behavior. This is true because the opposite of no complacency(NC) is complacency(C) so extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) can be seen as normal democratic outcomes(NDO) when upside down, but they require a special type of complacency( $C = ?$ ) to take place and to persist, a minority rule friendly one.

And notice that if we know the specific type of minority rule friendly complacency( $C = ? = C^*$ ) that leads to extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) then we can device ideas on how to reverse them totally or partially or we can see ideas on how to avoid them all together. As you may know, in 2017 the UK decided to seek a wider mandate for

BREXIT and the BREXIT side lost the referendum, a result that signaled a weaker mandate reversing the EDO tendency partially; and notice that democracies that were supposed to go extreme in 2017, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and so on stayed within the normal democratic outcome(NDO) world, and the question in all those cases is why that was the case?.

Therefore, the sudden coming of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) in 2016 such as BREXIT and USEXIT raised important questions relevant to understanding the behavior of the majority rule based democracy when upside down. Among the relevant questions raised are the following: a) What type of complacency( $C = ?$ ) leads to extreme democratic outcomes(EDO)?; b) What is the structure of BREXIT and USEXIT in terms of this specific type of complacency?; and c) What can be done to reverse and also what can be done to avoid extreme democratic outcomes(EDO)??. Among the goals of this paper is to provide an answer to these questions both graphically and analytically using qualitative comparative means.

### **Key concepts**

Majority rule, complacency, partial complacency, full complacency, democratic outcomes, normal democratic outcomes, extreme democratic outcomes, true majority complacency, true minority complacency, full participation assumption, full voting assumption, complacency assumption, BREXIT, USEXIT.

### **Introduction**


#### **a) The world of democratic outcomes**

It can be said a) that the world of democratic outcomes(DO) is the world where the democratic process( $V_1$ ) bring together competing group of individuals in order to determine who rules in that democracy; and b) that without clear participation and voting rules, the resulting democratic outcome(DO) can be a normal democratic outcome(NDO) where the majority view rules or an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) where the minority view rules depending on whether the will of the majority(T) or the will of the minority(M) is reflected by the group who wins the democratic process( $V_1$ ). In other words, if there are no clear rules governing participation and winners and losers in a democracy anything can happen, the model is not stable and it is without proper power checks and balances..

In other words, other things being equal, without a clear democratic process in terms of participation and winners and losers coupled with no clear power checks and balances we do not have a right democracy model. It has been pointed out that to get democracy right beside a clear democratic voting process we need democratic government powers that can be subjected to checks and balances(TE 2017). Notice that this view applies only when looking at democracy from the ruling majority point of view, not from the ruling minority point of view(NDO) as the rule of the minority is recent phenomena such as the BREXIT in the UK with the leave win(BBC 2016a) and the USEXIT in the USA with Mr. Trump win(Rawlinson 2016).

***i) The world of democratic outcomes(DO) graphically***

If we assume the following: a) that there are two democracies in the world,  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ ; b) that the voting system( $V_1$ ) in both places brings together competing groups of voters  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  so that  $V_1 = G_2G_1$ ; d) and then, there will be democratic outcomes(DO) in both places[ $DO_1$  and  $DO_2$ ] , but we do not know yet if the true majority view(T) or the minority view(M) wins the democratic contest as we do not know which views those groups represent or which view will prevail, a situation highlighted in Figure 1 below:



**Figure 1 The structure of democratic outcomes(DO)**  
**Democracies,  $W_1$ ,  $W_2$ , bring together different groups of individuals,  $G_1$ ,  $G_2$ , to compete in a voting contest  $V_1$  in order to determine democratic outcomes  $DO_1$ ,  $DO_2$ :**

We can appreciate in Figure 1 above the following: a) that under no clear voting rules we do not know who will prevail in the voting contest  $V_1$  as indicated by the continuous arrows from  $G_2$  to  $DO_1$  and to  $DO_2$ ; and by the continuous arrows from  $G_1$  to  $DO_1$  and to  $DO_2$ ; b) that under no clear rules governing the voting contest in both democracies  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  we do not know if those democratic outcomes  $DO_1$  and  $DO_2$  are normal democratic outcomes(NDO) or extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) as we do not know if they reflect majority views(T) or minority views(M).

***ii) The world of democratic outcomes(DO) analytically***

The structure of each democracy in Figure 1 above in terms of democratic outcomes(DO) can be expressed analytically as follows:

1)  $W_1 = V_1 = G_2G_1 \rightarrow DO_1 = ?$

2)  $W_2 = V_1 = G_2G_1 \rightarrow DO_2 = ?$

In both true democracies  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  we do not know what type of democratic outcome( $DO = ?$ ) we have as there are no clear rules about winners and losers; and also we do not know if they reflect the will of the majority or of the minority.

Notice that if we make  $G_2 > G_1$ , then  $G_2$  is the majority group T and  $G_1$  is the minority group M so that  $G_2 = T$  and  $G_1 = M$ ; and if we substitute this in expressions 1) and

2) above, then we can restate them in terms of majority(T) and of minority(M) blocks as indicated below:

$$3) W_1 = V_1 = TM \rightarrow DO_1 = ?$$

$$4) W_2 = V_2 = TM \rightarrow DO_2 = ?$$

Again in both democracies  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  even when in terms of majority(T) or minority(M) groups we do not know what type of democratic outcome(DO = ?) we have as there are no clear rules about winners or losers.


### **b) The world of normal democratic outcomes(NDO)**

It can be said that the world of normal democratic outcomes(NDO) is the world where the majority view(T) wins the majority rule based voting contest( $V = TM$ ) one person one vote as everybody is expected to participate and vote. In other words, this world operates under no complacency(NC) or no protest behavior. Here, there are clear rules governing winners and losers as well as there are clear participation expectations: the true majority(T) wins under no complacency(NC) and the true minority(M) loses as all members vote for the candidate of their preferred choice. And therefore, in true democracies under majority rule the following holds true:  $V_1 = V = TM$ , where T wins.

Majority rule based voting contests are at the heart of presidential democratic decision-making in most western democratic systems(Lewis et al 2006). It has been pointed out recently that normal democratic outcomes(NDO) are the expected result when true democracies supported by the majority rule based voting system(V) one person, one vote, operate under no complacency(NC) or under no protest behavior either by assumption or expectation(Muñoz 2017) as then the rule of the majority(T) wins and the view of the minority(M) loses.

### ***i) The world of normal democratic outcomes(NDO) graphically***

If we assume as follows: a) that there are two true democracies in the world,  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ , as they provide equal participation and voting rights to each individual; b) that both democracies are being affected by or are operating under no complacency(NC) or no protest behavior as everybody votes[NC( $W_1$ ) and NC( $W_2$ )]; c) that the majority rule based voting system(V) in both places brings together the true majority(T) and the true minority(M) so that  $V = TM$ ; d) and then, there will be normal democratic outcomes(NDO) in both places[NDO<sub>1</sub> and NDO<sub>2</sub>] as the true majority view(T) will win the democratic contest, a situation highlighted in Figure 2 below:



**Figure 2** The structure of normal democratic outcomes(NDO)  
 Under no complacency(NC) a majority rule based system(V) produces  
 a normal democratic outcome(NDO) in both places  $W_1$  and  $W_2$   
 as the true majority(T) wins.

We can appreciate the following in Figure 2 above: a) that under no complacency(NC) the true majority T wins the majority rule based democratic contest as indicated by the continuous arrows from T to NDO<sub>1</sub> and to NDO<sub>2</sub>; and that the true minority M loses as indicated by the broken arrows linking M to NDO<sub>1</sub> and to NDO<sub>2</sub>; b) that under no complacency(NC) in both democracies  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  we have normal democratic outcomes NDO<sub>1</sub> and NDO<sub>2</sub> respectively.

**ii) The world of normal democratic outcomes(NDO) analytically**

The structure of each true democracy in Figure 2 above in terms of normal democratic outcomes(NDO) can be expressed analytically as indicated below:

$$5) NC(W_1) = NC(V_1) = NC(V) = NC(TM) \text{----} \rightarrow DO_1 = NDO_1 \text{ since T wins.}$$

$$6) NC(W_2) = NC(V_1) = NC(V) = NC(TM) \text{----} \rightarrow DO_2 = NDO_2 \text{ since T wins.}$$

In both true democracies under no complacency  $NC(W_1)$  and  $NC(W_2)$  we do know what type of democratic outcome(DO) we have as there are clear rules about winners and losers; and therefore, in both democracies there is a normal democratic outcome(NDO) as in both places the true majority T wins the democratic contest.

Notice that expression 5) and expression 6) above reflect the structure of normal democratic outcomes(NDO) that are usually associated with the tyranny of the majority: the belief that majorities act irresponsibly specially against minorities if left unchecked or unregulated(TE 2017). To minimize concerns about the tyranny majority democracies under majority rule are subjected to respecting minority rights by international agreements on democracy and human rights(UN 1976) or by country government decisions such as Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms(GC 2017). Moreover, those two expressions 5) and 6) above reflect the structure of liberal democracies where the democratic contest is between moral vrs practical decision making based development, both local and global. The democratic process under those normal liberal structures is based on facts against facts and on science against science. It has been pointed out very recently that current liberalism


is a clash between moral vrs practical development choices(Muñoz 2015). The author believes that other things being equal when majority rule based democracies are consistent with human right legislation to minimize the tyranny of the majority we are then promoting responsible democracies.

**c) The world of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO)**

If we look at extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) as the total opposite of normal democratic outcomes(NDO), then it can be said that the world of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) is the world where the true minority view(M) wins the majority rule based voting contest(V) one person one vote in a true democracy and where the view of the true majority(T) loses as the democratic process in this case is operating under some kind of minority rule friendly complacency behavior( $C = ?$ ). In other words, extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) take place when democratic systems are under some time of extreme democratic outcome friendly complacency( $C = ?$ ) or protest behavior. This is true because the opposite of no complacency(NC) is complacency(C) so extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) can be seen as normal democratic outcomes(NDO) when upside down, but they require a special type of complacency( $C = ?$ ) to take place and to persist, a minority rule friendly one. Therefore, under extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) the will of the minority M wins the democratic contest in a surprising way as in the 2016 UK/BREXIT case(BBC 2016b) and in the 2016 USA/USEXIT case(Byers 2016).

***i) The world of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) graphically***

If we assume the following: a) that there are two true democracies in the world,  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ ; b) that both democracies are being affected by or are operating under extreme democratic outcome friendly complacency( $C = ?$ ) or protest behavior so that [ $C(W_1) = ?(W_1)$  and  $C(W_2) = ?(W_2)$ ]; c) that the majority rule based voting system(V) in both places brings together the true majority(T) and the true minority(M) so that  $V = TM$ ; and d) then, there will be an extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) in both places[ $EDO_1$  and  $EDO_2$ ] as the true minority view(M) wins the democratic contest, a situation highlighted in Figure 3 below:



**Figure 3 The structure of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO)**  
 When there is true minority friendly or extreme democratic outcome friendly complacency(C = ?) we have extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) as the true minority M wins the democratic contest.

We can highlight the following from Figure 3 above: a) that under extreme democratic outcome friendly complacency(C = ?) the true minority(M) wins the majority rule based democratic contest as indicated by the continuous arrows from M to EDO<sub>1</sub> and to EDO<sub>2</sub>; and the true majority T loses as indicated by the broken arrows linking T to EDO<sub>1</sub> and to EDO<sub>2</sub>; b) that under extreme democratic outcome friendly complacency(C = ?) in both democracies W<sub>1</sub> and W<sub>2</sub> we have extreme democratic outcomes EDO<sub>1</sub> and EDO<sub>2</sub> respectively.

**ii) The world of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) analytically**

The structure of each true democracy in Figure 3 above in terms of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) can be expressed analytically as follows if we make the extreme democratic outcome friendly complacency  $C = ? = C^*$  for simplification purposes:

7)  $C^*(W_1) = C^*(V_1) = C^*(V) = C^*(TM) \text{----} \rightarrow DO_1 = EDO_1$  since M wins.

8)  $C^*(W_2) = C^*(V_1) = C^*(V) = C^*(TM) \text{----} \rightarrow DO_2 = EDO_2$  since M wins.

In both true democracies under true minority friendly complacency  $C^*(W_1)$  and  $C^*(W_2)$  we do know what type of democratic outcome(DO) we have as there are clear rules about winners and losers; and therefore, in both democracies there is an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) as in both cases the true minority M wins the democratic contest. Notice that expression 7) and expression 8) above reflect the structure of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) that are associated with the tyranny of the minority: We should expect the minority view rule to be directed to destroy or to weaken common good friendly local and global institutions; and to destroy or to weaken common good friendly granted minority rights including human rights and freedom of expression as true minority view see majority rule and the protected rights of minorities as “the problem” with the state of the country or of the world.

For example in the case of USEXIT, policy and action has been directed at a) downplaying the role of or at criticizing international institutions like the EU(Levin 2016), NATO(Smith 2016), and the UN(Pramuk 2017) or local institutions like the US Senate(Crowe 2017), the US congress(Pear and Abelson 2017) and the media(Diamond 2016); b) at managing the so called minority problem or inefficiencies through immigration bans(Diamond and Almasy 2017) or building walls policies(Davis et al 2017) or removing existing minority rights(Jackson and Vanden Book 2017); and c) at declaring war on regulations(Del Guidice 2017) and on international agreements like PPP(Solis 2017), NAFTA(Morrow 2017), and the Iran nuclear deal(Holland and Bayoumy 2017), all done to please the minority view base.

After the BREXIT breakup from the EU is formal and completed we should expect a similar trend of attacks on regulation and institutions to take place in the United Kingdom affecting immigration policy and other social, economic, and environmental issues that fed the BREXIT voter or the BREXIT base(McSmith 2016) since just as it has happened in the USA there will be pressure to implement minority view friendly policies to keep the BREXIT base happy.

As extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) are normal democratic outcomes(NDO) upside down, there is no way to minimize concerns about the tyranny of the minority as minority rule is not consistent with the international agreements on democracy and human rights and it is not consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms mentioned in the previous section. Moreover, those two expressions 7) and 8) above now flip the structure of normal liberal democracies from moral vrs practical decision making based development to moral vrs immoral decision making based development, both local and global.

The democratic process under those extreme liberal structures is based on facts against fake facts and on science against non-science. Political positions that are not factual or not science based win the competition even when proven non-factual or nonscientific because of the true majority complacency under which extreme democratic outcomes take place. For example, the USA withdrew from the climate change agreement(Volcovici, 2017), not on factual grounds, but ideological grounds as the current government does not believe in the human causes of climate change(Milman and Morris, 2017). The author believes that minority rule based democracies are systems that are inconsistent with human right legislation; and hence these are systems with no clear legal means to minimize the tyranny of the minority: when going the way of minority rule based democracies we are then promoting irresponsible democracies.

And notice that if we know the specific type of minority rule friendly complacency( $C = ? = C^*$ ) in expressions 7) and 8) above that leads to extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) then we can devise ideas on how to reverse them totally or partially or we can see ideas on how to avoid them all together. As you may know, in June 8, 2017 the UK decided to seek a wider mandate for BREXIT and the BREXIT side lost the referendum(Bodkin 2017), a result that signaled a weaker mandate reversing the 2016 EDO tendency partially; and notice that democracies that were supposed to go extreme in 2017, the Netherlands in the March 14-15 vote(Graham 2017 ), France in the April 23 and May 7 vote(TG 2017), and Germany in the September 24 vote(Knox et al 2017) stayed within the normal democratic outcome(NDO) world and out of the extreme democratic



outcome world with the election of Mark Rutte , Mr. Emmanuel Macron, and Angela Merkel respectively; and the question in all those cases is why that was the case?.

#### **d) The need to understand upside down democratic outcomes**

Therefore, the sudden coming of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) in 2016 such as BREXIT and USEXIT raised important questions relevant to understanding the behavior of the majority rule based democracy when upside down. Among the relevant questions raised are the following: a) What type of complacency(C = ?) leads to extreme democratic outcomes(EDO)?; b) What is the structure of BREXIT and USEXIT in terms of this specific type of complacency?; and c) What can be done to reverse and also what can be done to avoid extreme democratic outcomes(EDO)?. Among the goals of this paper is to provide an answer to these questions both graphically and analytically using qualitative comparative means.

#### **Objectives**

a) To point out the specific type of democratic complacency that leads to extreme democratic outcomes; b) To highlight the structure of the democratic system in the USA and in the UK as normal democratic outcomes and as extreme democratic outcomes such as USEXIT and BREXIT; and c) To stress the complacency conditions under which extreme democratic outcomes can be reverse and under which they can be avoided all together.

#### **Methodology**

First the terminology used in this paper is shared. Second, operational concepts and operational models are highlighted. Third, the normal democratic outcome structure of the USA and the UK is discussed in detail both graphically and analytically. Fourth, the extreme democratic outcome structure of the USA and the UK is pointed out in detail both graphically and analytically. Fifth, the structure of the conditions under which extreme democratic outcomes can be reversed and under which they can be avoided all together is shared graphically and analytically. And seventh, some food for thoughts and relevant specific and general conclusions are provided.

#### **Terminology**

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V = Voting model

$V_i$  = Voter "i"

$G_1$  = Group of voters 1

$G_2$  = Group of voters 2

T = True majority

M = true minority

D = Democracy

TD = True democracy

T = Dominant/active component	t = Dominated/passive component
M = Dominant/active component	m = Dominated/passive component
C = Complacency	NC = No complacency
TC = True majority complacency	TNC = True majority no complacency
MC = True minority complacency	MNC = True minority no complacency
FTC = Full true majority complacency	PTC = Partial true majority complacency
FMC = Full true minority complacency	PMC = Partial true minority complacency
NDO = Normal democratic outcome	EDO = Extreme democratic outcome
BREXIT = UK June 2016 outcome	USEXIT = USA November 2016 outcome
ND = No democracy exists	CRE = Complacency rule expectations

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## **Operational concept and operational models**

### ***A) Operational concepts***

- 1) Democracy**, *system that aims at providing equal opportunity to elect, to be represented, and to share in the benefits to all its members;*
- 2) True democracy**, *there is equal opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;*
- 3) Partially distorted democracy**, *there is not equal opportunity in at least one democratic aspect;*
- 4) Fully distorted democracy**, *there is inequality of opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;*
- 5) Majority rule system**, *the electoral system where the majority rules decides the winner of democratic contexts;*
- 6) Voters**, *each individual in the electoral system acting without complacency and who is committed to make sure his vote or her vote is counted in the determination of the democratic outcome with the goal to maintain or improve his current or future benefits and rights;*

7) **True majority**, *the actual number of voters who win the democratic context;*

8) **True minority**, *the actual number of voters who lose the democratic context;*

9) **Complacency**, *the social discontent or protest or frustration affecting opposing groups with the given democratic or electoral system choices that may lead voters from the true majority and/or the true minority to not vote at all or if they vote they go for a protest vote by either voiding their vote or shifting their vote to other choices in the belief that their party will still win or will still lose anyway without their vote or in the belief that their vote is just one vote anyway and it will not matter in the end result; Hence, complacency based voting is linked to pure dissatisfaction as voting behavior takes place without thinking much about the impact that this action may have in the end on the balance of current and future majority and minority democratic rights;*

10) **No complacency**, *the absence of social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral system that leads each voter from each group to vote for their preferred democratic choice to ensure his or her vote is counted, therefore no complacency based voting is linked either to ensuring the preservation and enhancing of current democratic rights in one group or linked to seeking the erosion or change of those rights or to slowing the pace of democratic change in the other group;*

11) **Partial complacency**, *the partial social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is not widespread; some voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;*

12) **Full complacency**, *the general social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is widespread; many voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;*

13) **True majority complacency**, *it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;*

14) **True minority complacency**, *it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;*

15) **True majority no complacency**, *everybody in the true majority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;*

16) **True minority no complacency**, *everybody in the true minority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;*

17) **Normal democratic outcome**, *under no complacency or not protest behavior everybody votes and the true majority wins the democratic contest, governments retain or lose power without big surprises. Inclusion, equality, stability, harmony, the truth, trust, clarity, scientific facts, and the will of the majority for the common good are the heart of normal democratic outcomes.*

**18) Extreme democratic outcome**, *under full true majority complacency or full true majority protest behavior the true minority wins the democratic context, governments lose or win power under a big surprise as the democratic option that seems impossible to happen wins the day. Exclusion, inequality, instability, chaos, fake truth, fake trust, confusion, fake facts, and the will of the minority for the good of the minority are the heart of extreme democratic outcomes.*

**19) Internal complacency**, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by internal group divisions(e.g. divisive choice/leader selection);*

**20) External complacency**, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by external group divisions(e.g. equally disliked competing choices/leaders);*

**21) Full democracy**, *a full inclusion model, a true democracy;*

**22) Partial democracy**, *a partial inclusion model, a distorted democracy;*

**23) Democratic stability**, *the tendency towards harmony associated with specific democratic outcomes;*

**24) Full democratic stability**, *the tendency towards full harmony associated with normal democratic outcomes;*

**25) Full democratic instability**, *the tendency towards zero harmony associated with extreme democratic outcomes.*

**26) BREXIT**, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the UK withdrawing from the European Union.*

**27) BREXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of economic or territorial or state based unions.*

**28) USEXIT**, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the USA withdrawing from the international and local order.*

**29) USEXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of the international and local order.*

**30) EXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements aiming at destroying majority rule based institutions, locally and globally.*


**31) Democratic normalism**, *the tendency of normal democratic outcomes to move towards more stable or balance democratic conditions through time as they seek responsible majority rule.*

**32) Democratic extremism**, the tendency of extreme democratic outcomes to move towards the more unstable or unequal democratic conditions as they flourish under irresponsible minority rule.

**B) Operational models**

**a) The democratic outcome line(L)**

The democratic outcome resulting from following the majority rule based system can be represented in Figure 4 below assuming a) there are two groups of voters,  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  where group  $G_2 > G_1$  and therefore  $G_2 = T > G_1 = M$ ; and b) that  $G_1$  got  $X$  number of votes and  $G_2$  obtained  $Y$  number of votes; and hence,  $Y > X$ :



**Figure 4** The democratic outcome line: it matches the number of votes received by each group one vote per person under no complacency(NC) so that the true majority  $T = G_2$  got  $Y$  votes; and the true minority  $M = G_1$  received  $X$  votes.


Notice that Figure 4 above summarizes the structure of a normal democratic outcome(NDO) resulting from a majority based voting system(V) working under no complacency(NC), where everybody participates and everybody votes, matching that way the number of individuals in each group with the number of votes received by each group( $G_1 = X$  and  $G_2 = Y$ ). In others world, the democratic outcome line(L) showed in Figure 6 above matches the votes received by each group, where the true minority  $M$  gets  $X$  votes and the true majority  $T$  gets  $Y$  votes.

**b) The complacency range line(CRL)**

Complacency(C) or protest behavior may lead to a total or partial collapse of votes of the true majority(T) or the true minority(M); and this complacency behavior(C) determines the resulting democratic outcome. And since complacency(C) is negatively

associated with harmony or stability, the more complacency or protest behavior in the democratic process the less harmony or stability in the determination of the democratic outcome is to be expected.

In other words, the wider the complacency range(CR), the wider the possible vote collapse due to protest behavior, and therefore the less harmony or stability in the determination of the democratic outcome(DO). Hence, the wider the complacency range(CR) or the larger the size of protest behavior the more unpredictability with respect to the resulting democratic outcome(DO). This situation can be appreciated by looking at the direction of the arrow representing the complacency range line(CRL) in Figure 5 below:




**Figure 5** The complacency range line: The true majority(T) complacency range goes from point (ii) to zero; and the true minority(M) complacency range goes from point (i) to zero.

The arrow moving towards zero in Figure 5 above indicates the direction in which complacency(C) or protest behavior can make the true majority(T) and the true minority(M) vote collapse. Therefore, the complacency range(CR) for the true majority(T) in Figure 7 above goes from point (ii) to zero if the true majority vote collapses completely; and the complacency range(CR) for the true minority(M) goes from point (i) to zero if the minority vote collapses completely. We can see in Figure 5 above that when there is complacency(C) or protest behavior, there is vote collapse, and under those conditions a normal democratic outcome(NDO) is no longer guaranteed all the time as now the possibility of having an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) exists.

### c) The no complacency points line(NCPL)

When there is no complacency(NC) or no protest behavior we have a normal democratic outcome(NDO) as indicated in the introduction. In other words, when there is

true majority no complacency(TNC) and true minority no complacency(MNC) at the same time, we have a normal democratic outcome(NDO) under majority rule. The points of true majority no complacency(TNC) and of true minority no complacency(MNC) are shown in Figure 6 below:




**Figure 6** The no complacency points line: There is true majority no complacency(TNC) at point (ii); and there is true minority no complacency(MNC) at point (i); and therefore,  $T = G2 > M = G1$ .

We can see in Figure 6 above that under no complacency(NC) or no protest behavior everybody participates and everybody votes in the true majority(T) and in the true minority(M); and therefore, there are two normal democratic outcome(NDO) no complacency(NC) points: 1) the true majority no complacency point(TNC) at point (ii)-the true majority(T) votes at point (ii) so  $T = Y$  votes; and 2) the true minority no complacency point(MNC) at point (i)-the true minority(M) votes at point (i) so  $M = X$  votes; and under those conditions the true majority T wins. The situation in Figure 6 above is one of harmony or stability as it is normal democratic outcomes(NDO), the result of full no complacency(FNC) as there is true majority no complacency(TNC) and true minority no complacency(MNC) at the same time. In other words, under no complacency(NC) or no protest behavior we always have a normal democratic outcome(NDO).

**d) The complacency points line(CPL)**

When there is complacency(C) or protest behavior, then we can think about complacency points associated with the true majority(T) and with the true minority(M) and about vote collapses; and therefore, we can think about the instability in the determination of the democratic outcome that they bring, which are indicated in Figure 7 below:



**Figure 7** Complacency points line: There is partial true majority complacency(PTC) at point "c"; and there is full true majority complacency(FTC) at point "a". There is partial true minority complacency(PMC) at point "b"; and there is full true minority complacency(FMC) at point "a".

We can see in Figure 7 above the following complacency points: 1) a point of partial true majority complacency(PTC) at point "c"; 2) a point of full true majority complacency(FTC) at point "a"; 3) a point of partial true minority complacency(PMC) at point "b"; and 4) a point of full true minority complacency(FMC) at point "a".

With respect to the true majority(T), vote collapse, and the resulting democratic outcome, other things being equal, we can use Figure 7 above to highlight the following: 1) Point "c" is a point of partial true majority complacency(PTC) or partial protest behavior, it collapses a little from point (ii) to point "c", but still the true majority wins as  $Y - c > X + c$  and "c" is the size of the true majority(T) vote collapse under partial complacency(PC); and 2) point "a" is a point of general true majority complacency(FTC) or full protest voting or behavior, it collapses so much from point (ii) to point "a" that the true minority(M) wins as  $Y - a < X + a$ , where "a" is the size of the true majority(T) collapse under full complacency(FC). Therefore, under partial true majority complacency(PTC) the true majority T wins, but with a smaller true majority; and under full true majority complacency(FTC) the true minority M wins and therefore we have an extreme democratic outcome(EDO). Hence, the unexpected outcome happens, the extreme democratic outcome(EDO), only when there is full true majority complacency(FTC) or widespread true majority protest behavior.


With respect to the true minority(M), vote collapse and the resulting democratic outcome, other things being equal, we can say from Figure 7 above that: 1) point "a" is a point of general true minority complacency(FMC) or protest behavior, it collapses a lot



from point (i) to point “a”, where “a” is the size of the true minority(M) collapse under general complacency(FC); and it loses the election to the largest true majority(T) since  $Y + a > X - a$ ; and 2) point “b” is a point of partial true minority complacency(PTM) or protest voting or behavior as it collapses a little from point (i) to point “b”, where “b” is the size of the true minority(M) collapse under partial complacency(PC) losing the election to a bigger true majority(T) as  $Y + b > X - b$ . Therefore, under full true minority complacency(FMC) the true minority M loses to the largest true majority; and under partial true minority complacency(PMC) the true minority M loses too to a larger true majority;

**The normal democratic outcome structure of the USA and the UK**

Based on the operational concepts and models above normal democratic outcomes(NDO) take place when majority rule(V) based democracies operate under no complacency(NC) conditions. Therefore, if we make  $W_1 = USA$  and  $W_2 = UK$ , and we substitute this in Figure 2 above, then we get the structure of the USA and the UK democratic system in terms of normal democratic outcomes(NDO) as shown in Figure 8 below:



**Figure 8 The USA and the UK under normal democratic conditions**  
 Under no complacency(NC) both countries, the USA and the UK produced normal democratic outcomes NDO1 and NDO2 respectively.

Figure 8 above helps us see that when there is no complacency(NC) in the USA and in the UK the resulting democratic outcome is a normal democratic outcome(NDO) in both places, NDO1 and NDO2 respectively since the true majority T wins as indicated by the continuous arrows from T to NDO1 and to NDO2.

Analytically the structure in Figure 8 above can be stated as follows:


9)  $NC(USA) = NC(V_1) = NC(V) = NC(TM) \text{----} \rightarrow DO_1 = NDO_1$  since T wins.

10)  $NC(UK) = NC(V_1) = NC(V) = NC(TM) \text{----} \rightarrow DO_2 = NDO_2$  since T wins.

Expressions 9) and 10) above simply say that when democracies(USA, UK) under majority rule(V) are subjected to no complacency conditions(NC) they produce normal democratic outcomes(NDO<sub>1</sub>, NDO<sub>2</sub>) as the true majority T wins.

### The extreme democratic outcome structure of the USA and the UK

Based on the operational concepts and models above extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) take place when majority rule(V) based democracies operate under full true majority complacency(FTC) conditions. Therefore, if we make W<sub>1</sub> = USA and W<sub>2</sub> = UK; and we make C = ? = FTC, and then we substitute this in Figure 3 above, we get the structure of the USA and the UK democratic system in terms of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) as shown in Figure 9 below:



**Figure 9 The structure of USEXIT and BREXIT**  
 Under full true majority complacency(FTC) both countries, the USA and the UK experience extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) as the true minority M wins the democratic contest.

Figure 9 above let us appreciate that when there is full true majority complacency(FTC) in the USA and in the UK the resulting democratic outcome is an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) in both places, USEXIT = EDO<sub>1</sub> and BREXIT = EDO<sub>2</sub> respectively since the true minority M wins as indicated by the continuous arrows from M to USEXIT = EDO<sub>1</sub> and to BREXIT = EDO<sub>2</sub>.

Analytically the structure in Figure 9 above can be expressed as follows:

$$11) \text{ FTC(USA) = FTC(V}_1\text{) = FTC(V) = FTC(TM)----}\rightarrow\text{EDO}_1 = \text{USEXIT since M wins.}$$


$$12) \text{ FTC(UK) = FTC(V}_1\text{) = FTC(V) = FTC(TM)----}\rightarrow\text{EDO}_2 = \text{BREXIT since M wins.}$$

Expressions 11) and 12) above simply tell us that when democracies(USA, UK) under majority rule(V) are subjected to full true majority complacency conditions(FTC) they produce extreme democratic outcomes(EDO<sub>1</sub> = USEXIT, EDO<sub>2</sub> = BREXIT) as the true minority M wins.

**The structure of the conditions under which extreme democratic outcomes can be reversed**

Based on the operational concepts and models above normal democratic outcomes(NDO) always take place when majority rule(V) based democracies operate under true majority no complacency(TNC) as even when there is partial true majority complacency(PTC) the true majority wins; and this holds true whether the true majority no complacency process(TNC) affects normal democratic outcomes(NDO) ruled democracies such as USA and UK or it affects extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) ruled democracies like USEXIT and BREXIT.

Therefore, if we subject extreme democratic outcome based democratic process to true majority no complacency, TNC(USEXIT) and TNC(BREXIT) they reverse to normal democratic outcomes(NDO) as indicated in Figure 10 below:



**Figure 10 Transforming extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) into normal democratic outcomes(NDO) When extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) are subjected to true majority no complacency(TNC) we induce normal democratic outcomes(NDO).**

We can see from Figure 10 above that when extreme democratic outcomes ruled democracies such as USEXIT and BREXIT are subjected to true majority no complacency conditions(TNC) they take again the structure of normal democratic outcomes(NDO<sub>1</sub> and NDO<sub>2</sub>) as now the true majority T wins.

Analytically the structure in Figure 10 above can be expressed as follows:

13)  $TNC(USEXIT) = TNC(V_1) = TNC(V) = TNC(TM) \text{----} \rightarrow NDO_1$  since T wins.


14)  $TNC(BREXIT) = TNC(V_1) = TNC(V) = TNC(TM) \text{----} \rightarrow NDO_2$  since T wins.

Expressions 13) and 14) above simply indicate that when extreme democratic outcome ruled democracies(USEXIT, BREXIT) under majority rule(V) are subjected to true majority no complacency conditions(TNC) they produce normal democratic outcomes(NDO<sub>1</sub> , NDO<sub>2</sub> ) as the true majority T wins

**The structure of the conditions under which extreme democratic outcomes can be avoided all together**

Again, Based on the operational concepts and models above normal democratic outcomes(NDO) always take place when majority rule(V) based democracies operate under true majority no complacency(TNC) as even when there is partial true majority complacency(PTC) the true majority wins; and this holds true whether the true majority no complacency process(TNC) affects normal democratic outcomes(NDO) ruled democracies such as USA and UK or it affects extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) ruled democracies like USEXIT and BREXIT.

Hence, if we subject normal democratic outcome ruled democratic process to true majority no complacency, TNC(USA) and TNC(UK) then we ensure normal democratic outcomes(NDO) as indicated in Figure 11 below:



**Figure 11 Avoiding extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) all together**  
**When democracies under majority rule(V) are subjected to true majority no complacency(TNC) the produce normal democratic outcomes.**

We can see from Figure 11 above that when normal democratic outcomes ruled democracies such as USA and UK are subjected to true majority no complacency conditions(TNC) they keep the structure of normal democratic outcomes(NDO1 and NDO2) as the true majority T wins.

Analytically the structure in Figure 11 above can be stated as follows:

15)  $TNC(USA) = TNC(V_1) = TNC(V) = TNC(TM) \text{----} \rightarrow NDO_1$  since T wins.

16)  $TNC(UK) = TNC(V_1) = TNC(V) = TNC(TM) \text{----} \rightarrow NDO_2$  since T wins.

Expressions 15) and 16) above simply say that when normal democratic outcome ruled democracies(USA, UK) under majority rule(V) are subjected to true majority no complacency conditions(TNC) they produce normal democratic outcomes(NDO1 , NDO2) as the true majority T wins

## **Summary:**

a) Majority rule based democracies under no complacency conditions(NC) produce normal democratic outcomes as the true majority T wins; b) Majority rule based democracies under full true majority complacency conditions(FTC) produce extreme democratic outcomes as the true minority M wins; c) Majority rule based democracies under extreme democratic outcome conditions when subjected to true majority no complacency(TNC) they reverse to normal democratic outcomes, totally or partially as then the true majority T wins; and d) Majority rule based democracies under normal democratic outcome conditions when subjected to true majority no complacency(TNC) they remain within the normal democratic outcomes world as then the true majority T wins.

## **Implications**

The discussion above leads to four main implications: a) Complacency is link to the type of democratic outcome; b) Chaos or mistrust leads to complacency and order or trust leads to no complacency; c) if fake chaos is targeted to create full true majority complacency we can induce extreme democratic outcomes; and d) if factual discourse is targeted to create true majority no complacency we can induce normal democratic outcomes. The implications above suggest two things: a) the need to protect majority rule systems from the influence of fake chaos through legal and regulatory means and through education to minimize that way the manufacturing of minority rule friendly complacency; and b) the need to promote majority rule systems through legal and regulatory means and through education to maximize that way the creation of true majority no complacency based democratic systems.

## **Food for thoughts**

a) As the range of true majority complacency expands, is the likelihood of extreme democratic outcomes increasing?. I say yes, what do you think?; b) Should the goal of minimizing or eliminating complacency be a formal policy or goal of democratic governments?, I think yes, what do you think?; c) Should a mandate coming from an extreme democratic outcome be expected to be more chaotic to implement than one coming from a normal democratic outcome?, I think yes, what do you think?; d) Would political regulation requiring factual or science based or proof based political positions, platforms and discourse reduce democratic complacency?, I think yes, what do you think?; and e) Should we protect majority rule based democracies against the tyranny of the minority?, I think yes, what do you think?.

## **Specific conclusions**

First, it was shown analytically and graphically that under no complacency the USA and the UK democratic systems are ruled by normal democratic outcomes as the will of the majority wins. Second, it was pointed out analytically and graphically that under full

true majority complacency the USA and the UK democratic systems are ruled by extreme democratic outcomes as the will of the minority wins, leading to USEXIT and BREXIT respectively. Third, it was stressed that if we subject extreme democratic outcomes ruled democracies like USEXIT and BREXIT to true majority no complacency conditions they will reverse towards normal democratic outcomes as then the true majority will win in both cases. And fourth, it was highlighted that if we subject normal democratic outcomes ruled democracies like USA and UK to true majority no complacency conditions they will remain ruled by normal democratic outcomes as then again the true majority will win in both cases.

### **General conclusions**

First, the key to the existence of normal democratic outcomes is a democratic process under no complacency conditions. Second, the key to the existence of extreme democratic outcomes like USEXIT and BREXIT is a democratic process under full true majority complacency conditions. Third, the key to reversing extreme democratic outcomes like USEXIT and BREXIT is a democratic process under true majority no complacency. And fourth, the key to maintaining normal democratic outcomes in the USA and in the UK is the existences of a democratic process under true majority no complacency.

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